The Direct Attack: Just Asking for It

The Direct Attack: Just Asking for It
Many social engineering attacks are intricate, involving a number of steps
and elaborate planning, combining a mix of manipulation and
technological know-how.
But I always find it striking that a skillful social engineer can often
achieve his goal with a simple, straightforward, direct attack. Just asking
outright for the information may be all that's needed - as you'll see.
AN MLAC QUICKIE
Want to know someone's unlisted phone number? A social engineer can
tell you half a dozen ways (and you'll find some of them described in
other stories in these pages), but probably the simplest scenario is one that
uses a single phone call, like this one.
Number, Please
The attacker dialed the private phone company number for the MLAC, the
Mechanized Line Assignment Center. To the woman who answered, he
said:
"Hey, this is Paul Anthony. I'm a cable splicer. Listen, a terminal box out
here got fried in a fire. Cops think some creep tried to burn his own house
down for the insurance. They got me out here alone trying to rewire this entire two hundred-pair terminal. I could really use some help right now.
What facilities should be working at 6723 South Main?" In other parts of the phone company, the person called would know that
reverse lookup information on non pub (non published) numbers is
supposed to be given out only to authorized phone company MLAC is
supposed to be known only to company employees. And while they'd
never give out information to the public, who would want to refuse a little
help to a company man coping with that heavy-duty assignment?. She
feels sorry for him, she's had bad days on the job herself, and she’ll
bend the rules a little to help out a fellow employee with a problem. She
gives him the cable and pairs and each working number assigned to the
address.
MITNICK MESSAGE
It's human nature to trust our fellow man, especially when the request
meets the test of being reasonable. Social engineers use this knowledge to
exploit their victims and to achieve their goals.
Analyzing the Con
As you'll notice repeatedly in these stories, knowledge of a company’s
lingo, and of its corporate structure - its various offices and departments
what each does and what information each has - is part of the essential bag of tricks of the successful social engineer.

YOUNG MAN ON THE RUN
A man we'll call Frank Parsons had been on the run for years, still wanted
by the federal government for being part of an underground antiwar group
in the 1960s. In restaurants he sat facing the door and he had a way of
glancing over his shoulder every once in a while that other people found
disconcerting. He moved every few years.
At one point Frank landed in a city he didn't know, and set about job
hunting. For someone like Frank, with his well-developed computer skills
(and social engineering skills as well, even ,though he never listed those
on a job application), finding a good job usually wasn't a problem. Except
in times when the economy is very tight, people with good technical
computer knowledge usually find their talents in high demand and they
have little problem landing on their feet. Frank quickly located a well – paying job opportunity at a large, upscale, long-term care facility near
where he was living.
Just the ticket, he thought. But when he started plodding his way through
the application forms, he came upon an uh-oh: The employer required the
applicant to provide a copy of his state criminal history record, which he
had to obtain himself from the state police. The stack of employment
papers included a form to request this document, and the form had a little
box for providing a fingerprint. Even though they were asking for a print
of just the right index finger, if they matched his print with one in the
FBI's database, he'd probably soon be working in food service at a
federally funded resort.
On the other hand, it occurred to Frank that maybe, just maybe, he might
still be able to get away with this. Perhaps the state didn't send those
fingerprint samples to the FBI at all. How could he find out?
How? He was a social engineer--how do you think he found out? He
placed a phone call to the state patrol: "Hi. We're doing a study for the
State Department of Justice. We're researching the requirements to
implement a new fingerprint identification system. Can I talk to
somebody there that's really familiar with what you're doing who could
maybe help us out?"
And when the local expert came on the phone, Frank asked a series of
questions about what systems they were using, and the capabilities to search and store fingerprint data. Had they had any equipment problems?
Were they tied into the National Crime Information Center's (NCIC)
Fingerprint Search or just within the state? Was the equipment pretty easy
for everybody to learn to use?
Slyly, he sneaked the key question in among the rest.
The answer was music to his ears: No they weren't tied into the NCIC,
they only checked against the state's Criminal Information Index (CII).
MITNICK MESSGAE
Savvy information swindlers have no qualms about ringing up federal,
state, or local government officials to learn about the procedures of law
enforcement. With such information in hand, the social engineer may be
able to circumvent your company's standard security checks.
That was all Frank needed to know. He didn't have any record in that
state, so he submitted his application, was hired for the job, and nobody
ever showed up at his desk one day with the greeting, "These gentlemen,
are from the FBI and they'd like to have a little talk with you."
And, according to him, he proved to be a model employee.
ON THE DOORSTEP
In spite of the myth of the paperless office, companies continue to print
out reams of paper every day. Information in print at your company may
be vulnerable, even if you use security precautions and stamp it
confidential.
Here's one story that shows you how social engineers might obtain your
most secret documents.
Loop-Around Deception
Every year the phone company publishes a volume called the Test
Number Directory (or at least they used to, and because I am still on
supervised release, I'm not going to ask if they still do). This document
was highly prized by phone phreaks because it was packed with a list of all the closely guarded phone numbers used by company craftsmen,
technicians, a others for things like trunk testing or checking numbers that
always ring busy.
One of these test numbers, known in the lingo as a loop-around, was
particularly useful. Phone phreaks used it as a way to find other phone
phreaks to chat with, at no cost to them. Phone phreaks also used it a way
to create a call back number to give to, say, a bank. A social engineer
would tell somebody at the bank the phone number to call to reach at his
office. When the bank called back to the test number (loop-around) the
phone phreak would be able to receive the call, yet he had the protection
of having used a phone number that could not be traced back to him.
A Test Number Directory provided a lot of neat information that could be
used by any information-hungry, testosteroned, phone phreak. So when
the new directories were published each year, they were coveted by a lot
of youngsters whose hobby was exploring the telephone network.
MITNICK MESSAGE
Security training with respect to company policy designed to protect
information assets needs to be for everyone in the company, not just any
employee who has electronic or physical access to the company's IT
assets.
Stevie’s Scam
Naturally phone companies don't make these books easy to get hold of, so
phone phreaks have to be creative to get one. How can they do this? An
eager youngster with a mind bent on acquiring the directory might enact a
scenario like this.
Late one day, a mild evening in the southern California autumn, a guy I'll
call him Stevie phones a small telephone company central office, which is
the building from which phone lines run to all the homes and businesses
in the established service area.
When the switchman on duty answers the call, Stevie announces that he's
from the division of the phone company that publishes and distributes
printed materials. "We have your new Test Number Directory," he says.
"But for security reasons, we cant deliver your copy until we pick up the
old one. And the delivery guy is running late. If you wanna leave your
copy just outside your door, he can swing by, pick up yours, drop the new
one and be on his way." The unsuspecting switchman seems to think that sounds reasonable. He
does exactly as asked, putting out on the doorstep of the building his copy
of the directory, its cover clearly marked in big red letters with the
"COMPANY CONFIDENTIAL - WHEN NO LONGER NEEDED
THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE SHREDDED."
Stevie drives by and looks around carefully to spot any cops or phone
company security people who might be lurking behind trees or watching
for him from parked cars. Nobody in sight. He casually picks up the
coveted directory and drives away.
Here's just one more example of how easy it can be for a social engineer
to get what he wants by following the simple principle of "just ask for it."
GAS ATTACK
Not only company assets are at risk in a social engineering scenario.
Sometimes it's a company's customers who are the victims.
Working as a customer-service clerk brings its share of frustrations, its
share of laughs, and its share of innocent mistakes - some of which can
have unhappy consequences for a company's customers.
Janie Acton's Story
Janie Acton had been manning a cubicle as a customer service rep f
Hometown Electric Power, in Washington, D.C., for just over three years.
She was considered to be one of the better clerks, smart and conscientious
It was Thanksgiving week when this one particular call came in. The
caller, said, "This is Eduardo in the Billing Department. I've got a lady on
hold, she's a secretary in the executive offices that works for one of the
vice presidents, and she's asking for some information and I can't use my
computer I got an email from this girl in Human Resources that said
'ILOVEYOU.’ and when I opened the attachment, I couldn't use my
machine any more. A virus. I got caught by a stupid virus. Anyways,
could you look up some customer information for me?" "Sure," Janie answered. "It crashed your computer? That's terrible."
"Yeah."
"How can I help?" Janie asked.
Here the attacker called on information from his advance research to
make himself sound authentic. He had learned that the information he,
wanted was stored in something called the Customer Billing Information
System, and he had found out how employees referred to the system. He
asked, "Can you bring up an account on CBIS?"
"Yes, what's the account number.? "
"I don't have the number; I need you to bring it up by name."
"Okay, what's the name?"
"It's Heather Marning." He spelled the name, and Janie typed it in.
"Okay, I have it up."
"Great. Is the account current?"
"Uh huh, it's current."
"What's the account number?" he asked.
"Do you have a pencil?" "Ready to write."
"Account number BAZ6573NR27Q."
He read the number back and then said, "And what's the service
address?"
She gave him the address.
"And what's the phone?"
Janie obligingly read off that information, too.
The caller thanked her, said good-bye, and hung up. Janie went on to the
next call, never thinking further about it.
Art Sealy's Research Project
Art Sealy had given up working as a freelance editor for small publishing
houses when he found he could make more money doing research for
writers and businesses. He soon figured out that the fee he could charge
went up in proportion to how close the assignment took him to the
sometimes hazy line between the legal and the illegal. Without ever
realizing it, certainly without ever giving it a name, Art became a social
engineer, using techniques familiar to every information broker. He
turned out to have a native talent for the business, figuring out for himself
techniques that most social engineers had to learn from others. After a
while, he crossed the line without the least twinge of guilt.
A man contacted me who was writing a book about the Cabinet in the
Nixon years, and was looking for a researcher who could get the inside
scoop on William E. Simon, who had been Nixon's Treasury secretary.
Mr. Simon had died, but the author had the name of a woman who had
been on his staff. He was pretty sure she still lived in D.C., but hadn't
been able to get an address. She didn't have a telephone in her name, or at
least none that was listed. So that's when he called me. I told him, sure, no
problem.
This is the kind of job you can usually bring off in a phone call or two, if
you know what you're doing. Every local utility company can generally
be counted on to give the information away. Of course, you have to BS a
little. But what's a little white lie now and then - right?
I like to use a different approach each time, just to keep things interesting.
"This is so-and-so in the executive offices" has always worked well for me. So has "I've got somebody on the line from Vice President
Somebody's office," which worked this time, too.